INTRODUCTION

1
Many urban planners see shared space as an answer to the growing potential for conflicts on 2 busy urban roads resulting from a change in modal split away from a domination of motorized 3 individual transport. In shared space designs, the segregation between motorized and non-4 motorized traffic is removed, creating an integrated space without traffic signs or signals, curbs 5 and road markings. Instead, traffic flows are controlled by social interactions and supported by 6 intelligent infrastructure measures like colored floors or bollards. Due to this lack of legally 7 binding elements like pedestrian crossings, people are said to be more safety-conscious and to 8 pay more attention to the behavior of other people. Especially the high potential of conflicts 9 between different types of road users is said to be minimized. In conventional designs the 10 separation of traffic flows by modes was used to avoid these conflicts between cars, buses, 11 pedestrians and bikes. However, proponents of the shared space approach claim that this is an 12 outdated concept leading to unintended consequences (1, 2): 13  Attention of traffic participants in one mode towards those in different modes is lessened 14 as they feel safe and privileged on "their" assigned part of the road.
15
 As a consequence cars, but also bikes and other motorized traffic exceed the speed limits 16 and concentrate mainly on "their" part of the road leading to a higher risk for pedestrians.
17
 While modal splits are changing away from motorized individual traffic (MIT) current 18 street designs are not flexible enough to adapt to unexpected shifts and tend to prioritize MIT 19 hindering the development of "green" transportation. 20
There is ongoing debate about the merits and practicality of shared space ((2), (3)). 21
However, across Europe, in particular Holland, Germany and the UK, several shared space 22 projects have been planned and established. Furthermore, some practical analyses on existing 23 shared space schemes show the effects of shared space. Topp (5) concludes that safety related 24 data in before and after analysis show a neutral tendency in accident statistics of self organizing 25 shared space zones. Trial demonstrations at three junctions in Bristol (UK) showed that they 26 generally performed better after traffic signals had been voluntarily turned off (4). However, 27 these shared space analyses are carried out as experiments or before and after studies but do not 28 help traffic planners to judge concrete projects in advance with respect to safety and traffic flow. 29
Good planning tools are necessary to help convince the public as well as local authorities that 30 well designed shared space areas are advantageous for travelers in all modes (2), (3). 31
Problem Statement 32
The most essential phenomenon when modeling mixed traffic areas is the social behavior within 33 the interactions between cars, pedestrians and bicycles. This can be observed in situations where 34 pedestrians want to cross a road without a crosswalk and cars (sometimes) stop without the 35 normative need to stop only due to social factors. In slightly different situations, the same 36 pedestrian would make a small direction change to walk behind the car instead of waiting for the 37 car to pass. Modeling this and similar behavior is one of the main challenges when designing 38 shared space simulations. This paper shows the first steps towards such a model. 39
To the authors' knowledge no available simulation model can explicitly handle the requirements 40 that the added social interactions and constraints imply, yet. Such constraints include: 41  Finding the way through the infrastructure is more complex because there is no hard 42 separation between different traffic modes. Desired speeds are strongly dependent on the traffic 43 situation and not only on speed limit and vehicle platooning constraints. 44
Interaction between different types of road users including pedestrians, bicycles, and cars 1 need to be handled differently from conventional roads. Instead of modeling technical regulations 2 like traffic lights, there is a need to model the social interactions between people in different 3 transport modes. 4
Related Work
5
Up to now, research of shared space concepts has mostly focused on empirical studies showing 6 the impact of shared space, instead of creating simulation models. It is hard to imply a simulation 7 model from these works as the causalities of a measure to an effect is not always clear. 8
Individual aspects were analyzed by Richter and Zierke who show that removing the separation 9 between lanes on a country road effectively reduced speeds of cars (5), Davis in turn shows that 10 reducing speeds of cars increases safety of pedestrians (6). 11
While there is no combined simulation tool for shared space many approaches to 12 microscopic simulation of a single mode exist in the scientific literature. These are useful starting 13 points for a shared space simulation model. Two commonly used model classes used for 14 microscopic simulation are Cellular Automata (CA) (pedestrians (7), cars (8)) and physic 15 analogies like social force models (pedestrian (9), cars (10)). These models provide a good 16 foundation for handling basic interactions between agents from the same mode. Therefore the 17 work in this paper is based in large parts on the model suggested in (9 Therefore, as Schönauer and Schrom-Feiertag have proposed in (15), the infrastructure is 7 described by forces keeping the agents on their track, avoiding obstacles and using their 8 individual preferences. This hypothesis is then extended to an individual interpretation of the 9 lateral position, leading to a lateral distribution. The attractiveness potential field provides a 10 rasterized numeric field on the road plane, representing preferred lateral positioning on the 11 chosen path in the network. In the next step, gives the potential for the specific agent 12 on the associated guiding field . The relative position vector describes the shortest distance 13 from the agent to the guiding field. Finally (1) shows the created force vector which 14 "pulls" the agent to the lateral maximum of the attractiveness potential field. 15
16
For calculation of this field, we divide the simulation space into multiple areas: Straight 17 sections and intersection areas. Handling intersections is harder, due to a higher diversity of road 18 design and a multitude of possible routes. Guiding fields for pedestrians and bicyclists are obtained similarly. Even without explicit 1 sidewalks, people have to walk on the side of the road. Bicyclists are allowed to use the same 2 path as pedestrians, while some might use the center of the road -just like cars. Thus, the 3 individual guiding field for bicycles is determined by the desired velocity of the agent. For 4 guiding field calculation in intersections, the same algorithm as for cars is used. 5
While basic assumptions are made where different road users usually drive or walk, it is 6 important to note that this field is not manually created but modeled. The calibration of this 7 guiding filed model using real world data is future work. 8
OPERATIONAL MODEL 9
While the infrastructure model can provide a likely path for agents in free flow, we also need an 10 operational model which can handle pedestrian and vehicle dynamics when following this path. Since the vehicles will be guided by social and infrastructural forces a control system has 7 to stabilize the driving on an appropriate path during the simulation. On the one hand the lateral 8 component of the force is the main input of the steering model, while on the other hand the 9 longitudinal part of the force controls acceleration and breaking of the vehicle model. The input 10 forces are given by social interaction with other agents, by obstacles, the target vector plus the 11 guiding field of the infrastructure. 12
In the simulation the error measurements obtain the error by applying the vehicle model 13 continuing at the current steering angle ( ) for a time period . 
22
The preview distance is essential for stabilization of the vehicle. In this paper a constant preview 23 time is used for the lateral control inducing a preview distance linearly growing with 24 speed. 25
Application on a simulation of turning cars 26
In this section the application of the previously described models for a turn is presented. Within 27 the network of a redesigned through road in Gleinstätten (Austria), car turnings at an intersection 28 are simulated and the lateral track choice and the speed profile are verified with real trajectories. 29 
9
In Figure 3b a spatial overlay of simulated (red) and real world trajectories is presented. 10
As the reduction in speed is triggered much earlier than the steering impulse, the speed 11 control uses the tactical preview time > 2 seconds. The preview time leads to the tactical 12 preview distance . The preview distance determines both the deceleration and 13 the acceleration point. The same will be applied in identifying conflicts (next chapter). 14 The speed profile of the real data shows another phenomenon in lowering speeds in the 1 observed path at 250m: A bottleneck in the road design causes deceleration to a lower speed level, 2 while the curvature detector doesn't strongly react to this road feature. It has to be considered 3 that the full calibration of the social force parameters is future work. 4
TACTICAL MODEL 5
Social interaction is the precondition of mixed traffic at giving way processes, road crossing and 6 lateral evasion. At low speeds (which are typical for pedestrians) the social force model ensures 7 good fitting with empirical data even in high traffic densities. Including vehicular traffic in the 8 simulation, however, higher foresights would be needed but those exceed the capabilities of 9 social force models. Furthermore, voluntary actions like making a stopping to let a pedestrian 10 pass are much more common in shared spaces and therefore need to be addressed separately. 11
In this study therefore, we add decisions made by a tactical conflict solving system as an 12 additional force (t) to the existing forces. Hence, the resulting force vector of each 13 agent is the sum of the forces of the infrastructure guiding field , of the adapted social force 14 model force and the new tactical force (t) 15
The next sections describe this tactical conflict solving system. First we need to explicitly detect 17 situations where a possible conflict between agents occurs which cannot be handled by the 18 standard operational model. Each conflict has potential strategies to be solved like stopping or 19 dodging to the side. A Stackelberg game is run to decide which strategy has the highest pay off. 20
Conflict Detection 21
Conflict detection is done in regular intervals (one second seems to be a reasonable tradeoff 22 between detection in time and processing effort). Each agent is simulated on its own without 23 taking any other agents into account. The resulting trajectories indicate the exact path which 24 would be taken if no other agents were involved in the scene. All these trajectories are then 25 compared to find pairs conflicting in time and space. Within a certain radius around agents other 26 agents are considered to be relevant for interaction. 27
Once a conflict has been found, the conflict is parameterized with both agents' state 28 vectors, path and the normative situation. The angular classification is the first estimation before 29 further processing. situation as a game, we must specify the type of game, the number of players, the number of 37 games repeated, and whether the game allows cooperation. For simplification reasons we reduce 38 the number of active players in a single game to two. However, the conflict handling of a pair of 39 agents also influences other traffic participants surrounding them. This influence comes back 40 to both original partners via the reaction of the surrounding agents, consequently all the agents in 41 the vicinity of the conflicting partners can be recognized as interacting players. 42
Repetition of the game has to be defined. For our purposes, we assume that the number of 1 games is one for each of the agent pairs in conflict, and the games are independent from one 2 another. This is because the amount of time that the agent has to make a decision is not so long 3 that he or she can make multiple decisions, and because each decision is not affected by 4 preceding or following decisions, but is rather taken independently. 5
The possibility of receiving information about the other agent leads to the potential of 6 cooperation. Both players can observe the other agent's situation and have full information about 7 the strategies of the other one, i.e. the pay-off matrices. The agents, however, have no way to 8 exchange their decisions about executing the strategies. The game is therefore characterized as a 9 non-cooperative game with perfect information. 10 Due to simplification issues the possible strategies for conflict solving are reduced five. 11 Figure 5 drafts the spatial conflict situation and its strategy alternatives. 12 13 FIGURE 5 Without reacting, the two agents would collide shortly afterwards in point respectively .
14 When the conflict is identified, agent is located at and agent at . In a spatial context the 5 strategies of 
17
Besides the zero strategy the strategies of decelerating, accelerating and dodging 18 left or right are considered. The pay-off values are given by exogenous variables which are 19 speed, type of agent, time to the theoretical collision, the ideal path and the traffic regulations. 20
Game Solving 21
The presented conflict solving approach is based on a rational game play. This means, for the 22 same input variables, the game has a deterministic outcome. A Stackelberg game is a non 23 symmetric hierarchical game with leader and follower players -originally introduced to model 24 unbalanced markets (20). The leader who holds the powerful position announces its strategy, and 25 followers react to the leader's announced strategy. Due to the perfect information the leader 26 knows the follower's answer ex-ante to its own strategy. Simplified illustration in road traffic 27 crossing conflict: The car driver knows the pedestrian is most likely going to stop if the car driver 28 continues with full speed. In the proposed model normative and social aspects can shift the 29 leader's optimum towards stopping. by backward induction. We denote the sets of options the two players can choose from as for 1 the leader and for the follower. Let be the utility of the leader when the option 2 is chosen and the follower reacts by the move and similarly the utility 3 of the follower dependent on the choice of the leader. Let be the set of best answers to . 4 ,
5
Then the SPNE is stable for both players, providing that player i chooses the maximum of 6 the utilities dependent on the choice set of the follower j: 7
Multiple components are considered to estimate the utilities of both agents for every strategy pair 10
. The reduction of the conflict level gives the same pay off for both agents. Normative and 11 social behavior and discomfort and travel time factors are calculated separately. The utility of a 12 decision pair is given as a weighted sum of all partial payoffs for both players: 13 , ,
14 represents the utility matrices for every utility component including: is the entry 15 from one of the utility component matrices corresponding to that decision. For our game 16 we use the following utilities (note that utility matrices that agree for both players are denoted by 17 a subscript ij while otherwise they are denoted with a single subscript): 18 19 1. , collision avoidance , collision probability disutility coming from speed 20 differences, utility calculated as ), where is the relative speed 21 after following the strategy pair 22 2. , collision avoidance , length of the spatial relative vector of collision 23 probability disutility coming from distance, utility calculated as , where is the 24 distance between the agents after following the strategy pair 25 3. , collision avoidance , collision probability disutility coming from time distance 26 at the intersection of the projected trajectories of calculated as , 27
4. social utility for agents given as when the decision is 28 supported by social convention and 0 otherwise, i.e. for a car it is socially preferable to let the 29 pedestrian cross the street. 30 5. , saved detour utility, given as where is the 31 distance of the leader after three seconds of alternative i to their goal (respectively for the 32 follower) 33 6. , energy loss disutility utility (zero-strategy = 0) of the agents given as the 34 negative absolute value of the velocity change. The utility weight set are calibration 3 parameters. This requires the full data of the exogenous variables and an interpretation of the 4 decisions in the conflict solving process. 5
Application on pedestrians crossing the road 6
In this paper the tactical model is applied to interactions of pedestrians and cars within a shared 7 space designed road. A total number of 60 trajectories of interacting scenes have been extracted 8 from video footage resulting in 15 conflict descriptions. Figure 6 shows one of these interacting 9 scenes, where a pedestrian wants to cross the road while a car is approaching. 
16
In this particular example the car stops and the pedestrian continues, other input variables 17 like different time to collision might yield different results. For our analysis we assumed the 18 pedestrian to be the leader in the game. Furthermore, we restricted the behavior of the car to 19 stopping or continuing as the possibilities to turn were restricted by oncoming traffic on one side 20 and the edge of street markers on the other (see Figure 5 ). Furthermore accelerating was not 21 assumed to be a viable option as it does not seem a socially acceptable alternative. 22
The estimation of the weights is done by fitting the game results to the observed conflict 23 solving outcomes by estimating . Since the decisions of the game are done using a utility 24 maximization approach, for identifiability reasons one parameter is set to 1 as only differences in 25 utility influence the decision. We choose the parameter The parameters were estimated in 26
Matlab using the genetic algorithm (GA) function. 27
An example of the calculated utilities can be seen in TABLE 1 for a scenario where the  28 pedestrian continued in the original speed, while the car slowed down to let the pedestrian pass. 29 Due to the small amount of viable decisions collected we decided not to present the 4 estimated parameters here, as there is doubt if such a procedure can represent a parameter set 5 usable in a general setting. Instead we just did a sensitivity analysis of the collected parameter 6 sets. For the sensitivity analysis, we changed the fitted parameters one by one. We chose a range 7 from -95% to +95% of the original parameter values. The result can be seen in Figure 7 . 8 9 FIGURE 7 Sensitivity analysis of the decision power of the parameter. 100% represent the maximum 10 number of the correct classifications in the current model.
11
One can see that all parameters show some sensitivity to changes and we conclude that 12 the variables are chosen such that they all influence the decisions of the players. While there is 13 little sensitivity to an increase of the first 4 parameters, this might not be problematic as the 14 addition of more complex scenarios should improve the quality of the parameter estimates. 15
CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
16
In this paper we have adopted the social force model for cars by using a dedicated vehicle model 17 with an additional linear controller keeping the vehicles on a preferred path. This path is 18
represented by an infrastructural guiding field and is fed into the controller together with social 19 forces and forces from the vehicle model. First results from comparing the observed trajectories 20 with the simulated ones showed that this approach can model cars in a shared space infrastructure 21 -75% -50% -25% +0% +25% +50% +75% While using a social force approach to model interactions between vehicles as well as 3 pedestrians solves many conflicts in a shared space simulation there is need to add a tactical 4 component to allow social interactions like stopping to let someone else go first, contrary to 5 usual behavior in conventional road designs. For this purpose a game theoretic force component 6 was added to the social force model. While we use a non-cooperative game to decide on the force 7 component we can still use this to model cooperative behavior. This is done by adding a social 8 norm component to the utility. Indeed, the parameter significance analysis shows that the social 9 component does have an influence on the game's outcome and is therefore a relevant part of the 10 model. 11
In conclusion, the modeling concept of adding several parts, including a socially 12 influenced tactical model into the traffic model shows promise in producing a simulation model 13 for a shared space context. There are several missing modeling steps, e.g. bicycles show different 14 dynamic behavior than cars and hence a dedicated cycle model is required to represent two-15 wheeled vehicles. The calibration of the models should be expanded to include richer and hence 16 more relevant data-set collected in different shared space environments. Therefore, additional 17 videos from a new shared space in Graz (Austria) were recorded. This shared space design is not 18 only much more complex but also has a much higher frequency of social interactions because the 19 modal share in this area is roughly equivalent between cars, bicycles and pedestrians. Using this 20 data, it is expected, that the models and the calibration will be improved. This should allow the 21 model to be used on a wider range of different mixed traffic concepts. 22
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